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STATUTES OF FRAUDS
CARE OF THE AGED AND THE VIRGINIA
STATUTES OF FRAUDS
EDWARD S. GRAVES*
A problem which perennially recurs' in the administration of es-
tates is the disposition of a claim that the decedent orally promised,
but failed, to make a testamentary gift to one who attended him in
his last years. An obstacle to the claimant, where real estate is in-
volved,2 is, of course, the traditional Statute of Frauds; 3 in Virginia
there is also a special statute4 requiring written confirmation of the
promise.
The traditional Statute of Frauds is treated differently and the re-
covery is different, where the claimant institutes a suit for specific
performance and where he brings an action at law or files a claim be-
fore the Commissioner of Accounts. Consequently, there are two sep-
*Partner, Edmunds, Baldwin & Graves, Lynchburg, Va. Lecturer on Legal
Draftsmanship, Washington and Lee University.
Because of the assistance given by Macon Putney, John Paul, and Robert
Ketcham, the writer is able with a clear conscience to encourage other practicing
lawyers to undertake a "practical" article like this one. These law students, all in
their third )ear and busy with their class work and other responsibilities, have
done a fine job, not only of obtaining and checking citations, but of contributing
materially to the substance and organization of this writing. I am also indebted to
L. Bradford Waters, Esquire, Commissioner of Accounts of both Lynchburg courts,
for his suggestions and criticisms. The study would have been more learned and
complete if S. J. Thompson, Jr., of the firm of Caskie, Frost, Davidson and Watts
had been able to carry out his original purpose of serving as co-author; even so,
discussions with him have been stimulating and productive.
1Annot., 69 A.L.R. 14 (1930) collecting cases, covers over two hundred pages;
and the citator lists numerous additional cases. Since all of these are in appellate
courts, the claims presented, settled, or finally decided in trial courts must be legion.
No effort is here made, as will be apparent, to do more than analyze some of the
Virginia cases. It is helieved, however, that many lawyers will have the problem
here treated thrust upon them, either by a claimant or by an estate; and it is hoped
that this article will serve as a checklist of points which may have to be covered,
either in legal research or an investigation of the facts.
2Neither of Virginia's two Statutes of Frauds applies to personal property. Where
real estate is the subject of the promise, the Statutes apply even though personalty
may also be involved. Ricks v. Sumler, 179 Va. 571, 19 S.E.2d 889 (1942); Cochran v.
Bise, 197 Va. 483, 90 S.E.2d 178 (1955).
Wa. Code Ann. § 11-2(6) (1950). This statute appears in the same form as §
5561 of the Va. Code of 1919, § 2840 of the Va. Code of 1887 and Tit. 43, ch. 143, § 1
of the Code of 1849.
'Va. Code Ann. § 55-2 (1950). Code of 1919, § 5141; and Code of 1887, § 2413.
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arate lines of cases, which will be herein separately discussed, one5
dealing principally with .the part performance exception to the Statute
of Frauds, and the other" with the quantum meruit type of recovery.
There is no difference, however, in the court's treatment of the spe-
cial statute; and since it seems to be now chiefly of historical interest,
it will be discussed first.
I. SEC. 55-2: THE SPECIAL STATUTE OF FRAUDS
Prior to the revised Code of 1887, there were a number of cases7
holding that the oral promise of a landowner to convey real estate
to another if the latter would move upon and improve ,the land result-
ed in a contract enforcible in equity if the promisee had performed.
The Revisors of the Code, feeling that this was a "'most prolific source
of fraud' ", added to the statute the part shown in italics:
"No estate of inheritance or freehold, for a term of more than
five years, in lands, shall be conveyed unless by deed or
will ** *; nor shall any right to a conveyance of any such
estate or term in land accrue to the donee of the land or those
claiming under him, under a gift or promise of gift of the same
hereafter made and not in writing, although such gift or prom-
ise be followed by possession thereunder and improvement of
the land by the donee or those claiming under him.""
Patton v. Patton, 2o Va. 705, 112 S.E.2d 849 (1960); Wright v. Dudley, 189 Va.
448, 53 S-E-2d 29 (1949); Clark v. Atkins, 188 Va. 668, 51 S.E.2d 222 (1949). Adams v.
Snodgrass, 17.5 Va. 1, 7 S.E.2d 147 (1940); Couch v. Cox, 165 Va. 55, 191 S.E. 433
(1935); Cannon v. Cannon, 158 Va. 12, 163 S.E. 405 (1932).
OCochran v. Bise, 197 Va. 483, 90 S.E.2d 178 (1955); Burke v. Gayle, 193 Va.
13o, 67 S.E.2d 917 ('95'); Simpson v. Scott, 189 Va. 392, 53 S.E.2d 21 (1949); Rorer
v. Taylor, 182 Va. 49, 27 S.E.2d 923 (1943). Ricks v. Sumler, 179 Va. 571, i9 S.E.2d
889 (1942); Hendrickson v. Meredith, 161 Va. 193, 170 S.E. 602 (1933); Doughty v.
Thornton, 151 Va. 785, 145 .SE. 249 (1928); Jackson v. Jackson, 96 Va. 165, gt S.E.
78 0898).
WHalsey v. Peters, 79 Va. 6o (1884); Stokes v. Oliver, 76 Va. 72 (1882); Burk-
holder v. Ludlum, 73 Va. (3o Gratt.) 255 (1878).
'Wohlford v. Wohlford, 121 Va. 699, 704, 93 S.E. 629 (1917). The extent to
which one apprehends fraud in this situation would affect the stringency of the
requirements that one would advocate as conditions precedent to recovery. Not only
have writers of fiction presented the lonely old person as a natural prey to fraud
(e.g., Kind Lady, dramatized by Edward Chodorov from a short story by Hugh Wal-
pole); the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals indicated the same feeling in Cook
v. Hayden, 183 Va. 203, 31 S.E.2d 625 (1944). More recently, however, the Court
quoted with approval a commentator's statement that the danger of fictitious claims
of the existence of the contracts here considered was "more apparent than real," and
that old people may benefit from their being sanctioned by the courts. Burke v.
Gayle, 193 Va. 130, 135, 67 S.E.2d 917, 919 (1950-
"Va. Code of 1887, § 2.113.
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Was this remedial legislation, in view of its use of words of gift,
intended to apply only where no consideration moved from the
grantee, so that contracts are beyond its purview?
The answer, despite the choice of words, appears clearly to be in
the negative. The amendment was intended to reverse the doctrine of
such cases as Halsey v. Peters,o that equity would enforce an oral
promise to convey real estate where the donee was put in possession
and induced by the promisor to make valuable improvements on the
property. The language of ,the opinions in this case and in the leading
case of Wohlford v. Wohiford,"1 the first to interpret the new Code
provision, shows that oral contracts were proscribed as well as oral
promises, unsupported by consideration, to make gifts.
Moreover, the facts in cases decided before and after the Code
revision show that contracts were involved. In Burkholder v. Lud-
lum,12 decided in 1878, the claimants moved from one city to another,
and made improvements on the promisor's dwelling, in reliance on
the oral promise to convey. In the Halsey case, decided in 1884, at the
owner's request and in reliance on his promise to convey his farm to
the claimant, the latter moved upon the farm, giving up his business,
and made some investment of his earnings in the land. In the Wohl-
ford case, decided in 1917, the court reluctantly denied relief to a son
who, at his father's request, moved on the latter's land, sold his own
place, and applied the proceeds of sale as well as his own labor and
earnings to the improvement of the land, all in reliance upon the
father's oral'promise that he would devise the land to his son.
In each case, benefit was conferred upon the promisor when the
promisee improved his land; and there was certainly detriment to the
promisee. There is consequently little doubt that oral contracts, as well
as gratuitous promises, to convey real estate were intended to be in-
cluded within the scope of the remedial legislation.
In a series of decisions beginning in 1928,13 the court has, without
overruling the Wohlford case, held that section 55-2 does not require
a contract to devise real estate to be in writing. Of ithis series, the case
of Clark v. Atkins14 presents a close modern parallel to the Wohford
1 Supra note 7.
"'Supra note 8.
'-Supra note 7.
"Dickenson v. McLeMore, 2oi Va. 333, 111 S.E..d 416 (1959); Clark v. Atkins,
and Wright v. Dudley, supra note 5; Frizzell v. Frizzell, 149 Va. 815, 141 S.E. 868
(19-8.)
"Supra note 5.
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situation.'- Here the son of the landowner went to work for his father
in the latter's meat market, receiving $25 'per week at the beginning,
under the father's promise that if the son would work and learn the
business, the father would leave it to him. Less than five months later,
the father died, making no testamentary gift to the son. In affirming
a decree of specific performance, the court, following the lead of an
earlier case,' disposed of the remedial legislation in the following
words:
"We do not think that the section quoted has any application
to -the case at bar. Prior to the adoption of section 2413 of the
Code of 1887, now section 5141 of Michie's Code of 1942, an
oral promise to give or devise land, followed by possession and
improvements, was sufficient to support a right to a conveyance
from the heirs or devisees of the donor, but since the adoption
of this section such a promise must be in writing in order to be
enforced. ** * In the case at bar there was not a parol gift of
land. Atkins relied upon and proved an oral contract for the
purchase of the meat business and what pertained to it in ex-
change for his services in conducting and operating said busi-
ness for the lifetime of Clark. This consideration on his part
has been fully performed.'
17
There is this difference in the facts of the Clark and Wohiford
cases: in Wohlford there was express evidence that the father changed
his mind before his death, whereas in Clark the father without any
explanation neglected to make the necessary amendment of his will.
,7A comparison of the facts of the two cases is as follows:
Wohlford
The father promised to devise land if
the son would move on and improve it.
The son moved on the land.
The son sold his land.
The son moved his family from the
former home to the "promised" land.
The son not only worked on and im-
proved the land over a period of about
four years prior to his father's death,
but expended his own money thereon.
The son presumably enjoyed all the
benefits of the land.
All that the son did and expended was
upon the express promise of the father
to devise the land to the son.
'6Frizzell v. Frizzell, supra note j3.
";Clark v. Atkins, supra note 5 at 677.
Atkins
The father promised to devise and be-
queath a butcher shop and business if
the son would go to work in it and
learn the business.
The son went to work in the shop.
The son sold nothing.
The son was already there, having re-
turned from the wars.
The son worked in the butcher shop
and apparently learned the business, all
over a period of less than five months
prior to the father's death.
The son was paid $25 per week at the
beginning.
The son went to work pursuant to the
father's offer.
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That this difference does not constitute a true distinction is dem-
onstrated by Wright v. Dudley.18 Here the landowner, an old lady,
moved from her farm after the caretaker (and her husband) had been
living with her for about nine years, and went to live with a niece in
West Virginia, to whom she conveyed the property which the claimant
said she had promised to devise to her. The claimant brought suit,
during which the old lady (lied, to set aside the conveyance and en-
force the oral agreement. The court held that the landowner had
committed an anticipatory breach; set aside the decree of the lower
court, which had denied relief on the ground that the complainant
was entitled to monetary damages only and had received as much value
as she had given; and ordered specific performance.
This case shows that the difference mentioned between the Clark
and l'ohlford cases is not substantial; it also shows, rather dramatical-
ly, that once the caretaker is admitted into the home, he may be there
for good.
Section 55-2 may retain vitality in some variations of the situation
discussed. Since tlhe IVohlford case has not been expressly overruled,
the same result might be reached if the same situation recurred-the
claimant's moving upon land and spending money in improvements
upon the owner's promise to give the land to the claimant by his will.
Such a result would bring two innovations into statutory interpreta-
tion: a remedial statute, although phrased generally, would be con-
fined to the particular evil which induced the legislature to act; and
"although" would be construed to have the same meaning as "if."' 9
It seems, therefore, highly doubtful that the court will in a future
case hold that section 55-2 bars the enforcement of an oral promise
unless, to paraphrase a recent observation of Mr. Justice Frankfurter,2 0
the names of both parties litigant should be Wohlford. A defendant
in these proceedings would be ill-advised to place substantial reliance
upon the statute, whether the claimant asked for specific performance
or a quantum ineruit recovery; he should, rather, assume that the
legislature's effort to impose a requirement that these contracts be evi-
denced by some writing has failed.
"Supra note 5.
r"he Statute, supra, i. 9, provides that no right accrues to the donee "although
,such gift or promise' he followed b, possession and improvement. Should the
Coirt hold that the Statute is applied only where the promise was followed by
possession anl improvements, the last clause would limit what precedes it; and
Mhould have been introduced by such a conjunction as "if" or "where."
2"Frankfurter, J., partially concurring in Still v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 368 U.S. 35,
17 (1961).
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Ii. SEC. 11-2(6): THE TRADITIONAL STATUTE OF FRAUDS
A. Suit for specific performance
The portion of the traditional Statute of Frauds here applicable
reads as follows:
"No action shall be brought in any of the following cases:
"Upon any contract for the sale of real estate, or for the lease
thereof for more than a year; * * *
"Unless the promise, contract, agreement, representation,
assurance, or ratification, or some memorandum or note thereof,
be in writing and signed by "the party to be charged thereby, or
his agent; * * *"21
It was only nine or ten years after the enactment of the original
Staitute of Frauds that the doctrine of part performance was applied
and relief granted on an oral contract to convey real estate.2 2 Con-
fronted with such a well established exception to the English Statute,
upon which ours was modelled, the Virginia court would hardly have
been expected not to recognize and adopt the same exception to our
Statute.
It is accordingly well established, in the particular situation under
discussion, that the requirement of writing does not bar specific en-
forcement of the contract if there has been sufficient part performance.
The conditions precedent to enforcement are that the oral agreement
must be definite; the acts done in part performance must be in pur-
suance of the agreement; and denial of specific performance would
operate as a fraud on the promisee and inflict on him an injury
which is not adequately compensable in damages.
2 3
The application of the part performance doctrine to the situation
here involved does not appear particularly alarming; and actually,
when one reads many of these cases, the results seem so just that one is
inclined to forget the safeguards that the Statute of Wills24 and
2'Va. Code Ann. § 11-2(6) (1950).
1'Annot., ioi A.L.R. 923 (1936); Butcher v. Stapeley, ! Vern. 303, 23 Eng. Rep.
5,24 (1685).
" Cannon v. Cannon, supra note ii at i8-ig. Hence, where the court feels that
the contract is not established by clear and convincing evidence relief will be de-
nied. Hill v. Luck, 201 Va. 586, 112 S.E.2d 858 (196o); Clay v. Clay, 196 Va. 997,
87 S.E.2d 812 (1955); Taylor v. Hopkins, 196 Va. 571, 84 S.E.2d 430 (1954). Also, relief
will be denied where the acts done by the claimant were not solely referrable to
the contract; were not such as to corroborate that the contract was entered into,
and were not of such peculiar value as not to be compensable in damages. Friz7ell
v. Frizzell, supra note 13.
2 See Harnsberger v. Wright, 185 Va. 586, 39 S.E.2d (1946).
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Statute of Frauds were designed to establish. The three conditions,
properly applied, would appear to set up sufficient safeguards to pro-
tect the decedent in his absolute right to dispose of his property and
at the same time to prevent him from receiving the claimant's services
and support and, either through intent or neglect, failing to give the
promised compensation.
It is, however, their application by the court that may cause trepi-
dation to the successors of the decedent.
The first condition precedent, proof of a definite contract, may be
easily fulfilled by the claimant. In a typical case, all the claimant needs
to show is that he promised to live with and look after the decedent,
and the decedent promised to make a testamentary gift to him. The
duties promised by the claimant can be proved by what he in fact did
do. The decedent is not available to testify what additional services
may have been contemplated. The claimant may actually have derived
considerably more benefit than the parties contemplated. The de-
cedent's failure to make the promised testamentary provision may have
been due to a feeling that the claimant had not performed his part
of the bargain, rather than to neglect or an effort to cheat the care-
taker. Doubtless these considerations were before the legislature when
it imposed the simple safeguard that the promise must be evidenced
by some writing.
The second condition, that the claimant must show that he would
not have performed the acts except for the decedent's promise, appears
on its face to be formidable, but it can be met even though the claim-
ant's evidence shows that he derived considerable benefit from the
arrangement during the decedent's life; and although a family rela-
tionship exists which might at least be partially responsible for the
services.
25
The third condition precedent, that the claimant demonstrate that
he has suffered injuries which will not be compensable at law, is
loosely applied. In some of the cases, it is very difficult to see why the
claimant will not be adequately paid for his services if he is given
money damages. All the claimant did in the Clark case, for example,
was to work for something over four months in his father's meat mark-
et and manage it for a few weeks during the decedent's last illness.
His beginning wage was $25 per week. The court's opinion does not
show why it is impossible to evaluate in money the services rendered
by one who has worked in and managed a meat market, whether or not
-'Doughty v. Thornton, 151 Va. 785, 145 S.E. 249 (1928); Jackson v. Jackson,
96 Va. 165, 3i S.E. 78 (t898); Stoneburger & Richards v. Motley, 95 Va. 784, 3o S.E
(1898).
19 6_-,]
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the individual is a relative of the owner. In other cases, it is true, more
difficulty may be encountered in ascertaining the value of the ser-
vices rendered, as where a farm rather than a small business is oper-
ated, and the claimant, in addition, renders some personal services. But
surely the claimant's failure to bear the burden of proving his case
does not of itself demonstrate that the services rendered are of the
requisite extraordinary nature. It is believed, for example, that many
registered or practical nurses or paid companions would be delighted
and flattered to learn that seven men, schooled in a completely objec-
tive and judicial approach, and careful in their protection of decedents'
estates, would in measured periods term their services so special and
unpurchasable as not to be compensable in money. Especially ought
members of a family to be gratified to learn how unique they are when
they look after a mother or a brother in the last years of their lives.
The reply made by the court when an argument of the adequacy
of monetary compensation was pressed seems an interesting example
of the technique of answering a question by changing the subject:
"It is urged that the services of Atkins were not of a particular
or personal nature; that they could have been compensated in
damages at law, and that under such circumstances he was not
entitled in equity to the specific execution of the agreement.
The trial court, in its opinion, had this to say: 'Whatever may
have been his reason therefor, the evidence convinces me that
Arthur Clark had a real and worthy interest in the welfare
and future of 1\7M. A. Atkins, wanted to do something worth-
while for him and intended that Atkins should have a sub-
stantial part of Clark's considerable estate. The meritorious
outweigh the valuable considerations as it seems to me. Both,
taken together, are amply sufficient to support the contract, if
there was one. Clark, in words and conduct seems to have rec-
ognized a high moral obligation to Atkins which equity will in
a proper case treat as meritorious consideration. Pomeroy's
Eq. Jut., 5 th ed., Sec. 588; Adams v. Snodgrass, 175 Va. 1, 7, 7
S.E.2d 147.' "";
All in all, the claimant may fare well if the person he attended
promised him property, and he brings his proceeding in equity for
specific performance.
B. Recovery on a quantum meruit and quantum valebant basis
Since the doctrine of part performance applies only in suits for
specific performance, and is equitable, the traditional Statute of Frauds
'Clark v. Atkins, supra note ii at 677.
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bars other proceedings based on breach of the oral contract between
the decedent and the caretaker.
This does not mean, however, that the claimant must fail if he
seeks remedies other than specific performance. If he makes a claim for
the value of services rendered and goods supplied, or if he asks for
specific performance and it is denied because of the Statute of Frauds
he may nevertheless be awarded compensation based on the value of
the services and goods.2 7
Since the contract is not enforced, the measure of recovery is the
value of what has been furnished to the decedent, and not the value
of the property promised. It is this value objectively appraised, and
not the value to the particular decedent.28 When the value of the
claim has been thus established, the value of what the claimant has
received must be deducted.29
The procedure followed may be by filing a claim with the Com-
missioner of Accounts; - 0 by motion for judgment for the value of the
services and goods; 3' by motion for judgment for breach of contract;32
or by suit for specific performance in which the chancellor may order
an issue out of chancery if the contract is not specifically enforcible. 33
One interesting phase of the law in this line of cases is the signif-
icance of the contract in determining the effect of the Statute of Limi-
tations. If the claimant does not prove a contract, then he is limited
to the value of what he furnished over the three years preceding the
institution of the action.34 If, however, the claimant alleges and proves
a contract, even though it is not enforcible, the Statute runs from the
date of death, since it is only then that the breach of contract is held to
occur.35 It is difficult to follow the reasoning that supports this latter
result. The contract is made unenforcible by the Statute of Frauds,
so that it may not be used to ascertain the measures of damages. Yet it
fixes the date of payment.
The use of the date of death to start the statute running might
more logically be placed, whether or not there is a contract, on the
ground that the statute was tolled by the decedent's action, or perhaps
more accurately failure to act, which is equivalent to a fraudulent con-
-Supra note 6.
"Hendrickson v. Meredith, and Ricks v. Sumler, supra note 6.
"'Hendrickson v. Meredith, and Cochran v. Bise, supra note 6.
z Rorer v. Taylor, supra note 12.
31Doughty v. Thornton, and Hendrickson v. Meredith, supra note 12.
-sinpsOin v. Scott, and Cochran v. Bise, supra note 6.
1'.Supra note 23.
"Harnsberger v. Wright, supra note 24; and Cochran v. Bise, supra note 6.
'Supra note 24.
InA"l V-PAIr"Irve r1r.
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cealment of the cause of action. Or it might be said that the implied
contract contains an implied term that payment is not to be made
until death. At any rate, under the present reasoning, failure by the
claimant to allege and prove a contract in this situation may drastical-
ly reduce his recovery.
One other factor considered in this line of cases is the relationship
between the parties. All of us normally feel an affection for and an
obligation to supply the needs of members of our families who require
our services and help. Three cases in Virginia have accordingly held
that a relative may recover only if he proves an express contract to
pay.3 0
If this principle is accepted at its face value, it might appear that
a close relative would be stymied. He cannot recover on the express
contract because of the Statute of Frauds; and he cannot recover on
the quantum meruit and quantum valebant basis because that would
be allowing recovery on an implied contract. It is not believed, how-
ever, that such an interpretation would be correct, but that the court
in the three cases is only emphasizing that the proof must be clear
where the relationship between the parties is such that they would be
expected to help each other without remuneration. Certainly the court
has gone far in the specific performance line of cases in permitting
recovery by close relatives; and there is no logical reason to hold that
they must fall between two schools if they seek the quantum meruit
type of recovery.
In fact, there seems to be no logical reason why the court insists
on the effect of the family relationship in one line of cases and does
not mention it in the other.
The claimant may not fare too poorly if he does not seek, or is
denied, specific performance. In fact, where the net amount of what
he has furnished is as great as the estate,3 7 he is as well off in one line
of cases as the other.
It should not be overlooked, however, that where the claimant
proceeds on the implied contract, the value of what he received during
the period he cared for the decedent must be charged against him,
and, as the trial court thought in the Wright case,38 might be worth
as much as the goods and services he furnished. The claimant who can
prove a case entitling him to specific performance, however, never has
to worry about what he has received; and if the property promised ex-
ceeds the value of the services and goods furnished, he stands in a
• Supra note 25.
3'Ricks v. Sunler, supra note 6.
3bWright v. Dudley, supra note 5.
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much better position than one who proceeds on the implied contract
theory.
Counsel for the claimant will consequently, if there is an option
on the facts presented to him, prefer to ask for specific performance.
I1. CORROBORATION
Corroboration is treated separately, since it affects recovery in both
lines of cases.
The Virginia "dead man" statute39 declares that where one of the
parties is incapable of testifying, no decree shall be entered against
him or his successors on the uncorroborated evidence of the adverse
party. One recent case in this field is a good illustration of a careful
corroboration of all the elements of the claim.4 0 Another illustrates
the denial of recovery where the court feels that the testimony of dis-
interested witnesses is as consistent with the theory of the defense as of
the claimant.
4 '
In several others, 2 however, there was a failure to obtain indepen-
dent evidence corroborating all the elements of the claim. Recovery
was nevertheless approved; and -the court explained that the legisla-
ture did not intend to require independent corroboration of the claim
in every particular; it was sufficient that the evidence of the interested
party should be "confirmed" and "strengthened" by disinterested per-
sons. Precisely what this test means is not apparent from the decisions.
It is sufficiently fluid so that the court may find corroboration or not,
depending upon whether it feels that the claimant should recover
4 3
IV. CONCLUSION
Courts have never hesitated to apply the limitations of the Statute
of Wills, and to hold testamentary dispositions not sanctioned by the
legislature to be of no effect.
Where a contract claim against a decedent is involved, however,
courts in both this country and England have enforced oral claims
against decedents' real estate, despite the legislative mandate requiring
some written evidence. The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has
"Va. Code Ann. § 8-286 (195o).
l°Patton v. Patton, supra note 5.
"Taylor v. Hopkins, supro note 22.
-Clark v. Atkins, supra note 5; Timberlake v. Puga, 158 Va. 397, 163 S.E. 402
(1932); and Simpson v. Scott, supra note 6.
'3Note, for example, the court's distinction of the Clark case, supra note 5,
in the Taylor case, supra note 22, 196 Va. 58o.
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gone further than most courts. It has permitted claimants to travel two
roads to recovery, despite the traditional Statute of Frauds; and it has
emasculated a special statute directed toward protecting decedents'
real estate against oral claims.
All of the cases, to judge from the written opinions, seem to result
in an equitable or sensible distribution of the decedents' property
but it is difficult not to be disturbed by their implications, and to
wonder whether the court would ever accept a legislative determina-
tion that there must be written evidence in order to obtain a recovery
in this field. One approach that might succeed would be to follow a
path already travelled by the court. This would be the adoption of a
statute authorizing a quantum meruit recovery when the claimant can-
not prove a writing. The limit of recovery would be the value of what
the claimant has furnished the decedent offset by the value of what he
has received. Under such legislation, the claimant would not be
greatly harmed and if recoveries could be kept within these limits the
possibility of asserting fraudulent claims would be minimized.
